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Abstract
This paper discusses differing perspectives relevant to library and 
information studies (LIS) regarding the philosophy of information, 
primarily disparate accounts of ontology. The perspectives include, 
but are not limited to, those of Luciano Floridi, Raphael Capurro, 
Michael Eldred, applied ontologists like Pierre Grenon and Barry 
Smith, Fred Fonseca, and Bernd Frohmann. Slavoj Žižek’s parallax 
ontology is used as a leitmotif and theoretical frame to provide a 
comprehensive and nuanced understanding of differing standpoints 
on ontological issues within LIS and the philosophy of information. 
Parallax ontology is presented not as a replacement for any particu-
lar perspective but rather as a means to utilize the differing points 
of view. The antinomies within and between these perspectives are 
not overcome through some kind of synthesis but instead disclose 
the fundamentally irreconcilable nature of the topic of ontology 
itself, particularly within LIS and the philosophy of information. 
The paper concludes with an assessment of the importance of this 
type of research, and the topics of ontology and the philosophy of 
information in particular. 
Introduction
This research breaks ground on the topics of information and ontology 
and the relationship between the two. It does not directly address what 
Floridi (2004) refers to as “the elementary problem”—that is, what is in-
formation? Instead, it provides analysis of views on the topic of informa-
tion and “information-related phenomena” (Furner, 2010), presenting 
different perspectives on the ontological understanding of information 
using Žižek’s parallax ontology as a leitmotif and theoretical frame. This 
requires some background on existing approaches to ontology and dis-
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course on information, particularly within, but not limited to, information 
studies. It is a critical analysis zooming in on information (as a thing, pro-
cess, social construct, polysemic term requiring etymological examina-
tion, and so on) within a larger project comprised of a critical analysis of 
ontology itself that is relevant to information studies. Although the dis-
course covers matters relevant to information studies, due to the inter-
disciplinary nature of the topic (like most topics in information studies), 
the scope of the discussion must extend beyond information studies. For 
good reason, in a practical field like LIS, significant justification for this 
type of research is warranted. The paper concludes on a persuasive note 
on the importance of this type of research in general, and the topics of 
ontology and information in particular. 
The perspectives expressed below are not necessarily the views of the 
author, and the peculiar language therein is obligatory in illustrating the 
inchoate nature of ontology. The seemingly chaotic findings may be un-
settling for even the intended audience if it anticipates a coherent, well-
organized modeling of these phenomena. Ultimately, this paper takes a 
critical theoretical approach, examining thinking concerning ontology, 
information, the role of information in ontology, and the ontological un-
derstanding of information. Therefore, a critical analysis of the relation-
ship between information and ontology must try to answer at least the 
following two questions: What is the role of information in ontology? And 
what is ontology with respect to information? One might think that the 
prior question presumes to situate information within ontological under-
standing; the latter might give the impression that information has onto-
logical priority—that is, the existential (in the analytic philosophical sense 
rather than the continental existentialist sense) foundation for reality. 
However, simply answering these two questions, as complicated as they may 
be, would oversimplify a critical analysis of information ontology and the 
ontology of information. Although these are research questions, what fol-
lows is not an attempt to answer them comprehensively but rather a flesh- 
ing out and analysis of differing perspectives’ attempts to answer them. 
The following demonstrates that although these points of view are, at 
times, incommensurable, even containing internal alterities, due to the 
nature of information and ontology, the more strongly and elegantly ar-
ticulated the perspectives are, the clearer the picture we will get of the 
phenomena at hand through the triangulated perspective that these dif-
fering vantage points provide together. It is necessary to discuss compu-
tational ontology, particularly applied ontology as defined by Munn and 
Smith (2008), which provides the most comprehensive philosophical 
framework for computational ontology development. Furthermore, this 
research engages the dialectic between the differing philosophical orien-
tations toward the digital ontology of Floridi on the one hand, and Eldred 
and Capurro on the other. Such an account is vital because it can
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•	 provide	students,	practitioners,	researchers,	and	other	scholars	with	a	
better grasp of what ontology means in different contexts; 
•	 help	 them,	 through	 deductive	 reasoning,	 conclude	 what	 the	 term	
means within the context of their profession; 
•	 provide	knowledge-management	specialists	better	fundamental	under-
standing of computational ontology’s grounding principles, thus pro-
viding them with a more nuanced appreciation of the strengths and 
weaknesses of that thinking in system development; and
•	 aid	educators	in	elucidating	what	ontology means contextually, particu-
larly within the context of knowledge management (Compton, 2014a, 
2014b).  
We will also look at how Frohmann (2004), from a partially linguistic 
orientation, argues that information is an untenable concept, and discusses 
the mutual relevance among this subject, early documentation practices 
in Western science, and ontology. Prior to concluding, this paper assesses 
Floridi’s (2002) suggestion, and the contentions it aroused, that the phi-
losophy of information is the most favorable candidate for the intellectual 
foundation of LIS.1 Here, it is argued that it is not entirely fair to dismiss 
Floridi’s view on the matter as a naïve outsider-to-the-field’s sin (Corne-
lius, 2004), in the original biblical sense of the notion of sin as “missing 
the mark,” but rather that it is yet another essential perspective that con-
tributes to a more accurate and comprehensive understanding of what 
the diverse field of LIS is. 
The Seamless Boundaries between the Online World 
and the Real World
When shown the laundry facilities during a tour as a new resident of my 
apartment complex, I was told that the washers and dryers could send a 
text message to my cellular phone to let me know when my clothes com-
pleted their cycles. This is one simple example of how information tech-
nology not only makes the inconveniences facing the subaffluent like me 
less inconvenient but also, of the “internet of things,” creates an amor-
phous integration of and intercommunication between the internet and 
the physical world. At this early stage of that technology, one may describe 
it using propositions from a number of perspectives. For example, one 
might say that the internet of things is an unhedging of the network al-
lowing application software to perform tasks appropriating objects and 
processes in the world as interfaces and as informational and manipu-
lable components. From another perspective, one could assert that the 
internet of things is an envelopment of the physical world into compo-
nents of the network. Possible pan-computational interpretations of the 
internet of things might view this technology as a sort of awakening of the 
computational nature of the universe, or as the beginning of a universal 
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computer that will eventually spread the filaments of its network outward 
until the computer and the universe become one.2 It is possible that one 
of these or some other explanation will become definitive. However, at 
present, it seems like any one of them might be helpful to technology 
professionals, researchers, philosophers, and even everyday users in un-
derstanding this emerging phenomenon. Moreover, someone who freely 
shifts his or her mode of perspective might be better capable of using and 
contributing to the development of this technology because it provides 
more vantage points from which to solve problems. This last idea demon-
strates the value of Žižek’s parallax ontology described below. 
Parallax Ontology
Žižek’s (2006) parallax metaphor is a simple though elegant and power-
ful philosophical tool for attending to dichotomies and antinomies be-
tween, and even within, particular theoretical orientations on given sub-
ject matter. Rather than dismissing the incommensurability of polarities 
and discarding contradictions regarding a topic, when fruitful it is better 
to examine the “constantly shifting perspective between two points be-
tween which no synthesis or mediation is possible . . . there is no rapport 
between the two levels, no shared space—although they are closely con-
nected, even identical in a way” (p. 4). Žižek stresses the necessity of identi-
fying the “parallax gap,” or “gaps,” in the dialectic between “closely linked 
perspectives [for] which no neutral common ground is possible” (p. 4), 
thus replacing the notion “of the polarity of opposites with the concept 
of the inherent ‘tension,’ gap, noncoincidence, of the One itself” (p. 7). 
We shall see later on how the fundamentally different perspectives on 
digital ontology and other related ontological points of view are necessary 
to obtain a clearer understanding of the subject matter, and how, despite 
their differences, they relate many of the same findings instantiated so 
differently that they seem either at odds or unrelated, but nevertheless 
taken together help to better illuminate ontology, technology, and social, 
psychological, existential, and many other facets regarding reality in the 
digital age. Albeit rudimentary, Žižek defines parallax as:
the apparent displacement of an object (the shift of its position against 
a background), caused by a change in observational position that pro-
vides a new line of sight. The philosophical twist to be added, of course, 
is that the observed difference is not simply “subjective,” due to the fact 
that the same object which exists “out there” is seen from two different 
stances, or points of view. It is rather that, as Hegel would have put it, 
subject and object are inherently “mediated,” so that an “epistemologi-
cal” shift in the subject’s point of view always reflects an “ontological” 
shift in the object itself. Or—to put it in Lacanese3—the subject’s gaze 
is always-already inscribed into the perceived object itself, in the guise 
of its “blind spot,” that which is “in the object more than the object 
itself,” the point from which the object itself returns the gaze. (p. 17) 
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 Although only tangentially relevant to this article, Žižek identifies com-
mon, helpful instances illustrating parallax gaps, including: “quantum 
physics (the wave–particle duality)” (p. 7) of which Floridi (2008b) speaks 
when arguing that assumptions about reality being either discrete (digi-
tal) or continuous (analogue) are untenable; “the ontological difference it-
self as the ultimate parallax that conditions our very access to reality”;4 
“the parallax of neurobiology (the realization that, when we look behind 
the face into the skull, we find nothing; ‘there’s no one at home’ there, 
just piles of gray matter—it is difficult to tarry with this gap between 
meaning and the pure Real)” (p. 7); and, finally, “the scientific parallax, 
the irreducible gap between the phenomenal experience of reality and its 
scientific account/explanation, which reaches its apogee in cognitivism, 
with its endeavor to provide a ‘third-person’ neurobiological account of 
our ‘first-person’ experience” (p. 10). Observations of this kind between 
antinomies and informational gaps in theoretical perspectives will be ad-
dressed throughout the remainder of this paper. 
What Is the Role of Information in Ontology and What Is Ontology with  
Respect to Information? 
It seems inevitable that when one addresses information, one must also ad-
dress the distinction, seamless as it may be, between digital and analogue 
information, as well as the data–information–knowledge–wisdom spec-
trum. One might take an approach classifying different forms of ontology 
respective to these different categories and potential subcategories; for 
example, information ontology, digital information ontology, analogue 
information ontology, epistemological (that is, knowledge) ontology, and 
so on. Unfortunately, there is no clean, definitive answer to the questions 
asked in the title of this section. In a seemingly contradictory manner, 
parallax ontology provides a simplifying metaphor, allowing the assimila-
tion of multiple conflicting perspectives into a holism that is internally 
inconsistent at times but nonetheless provides a clearer, comprehensive 
description of ontology and information and the relationship between 
the two. To some (for example, analytic philosophers like Smith [2008] 
who adopt Quine’s ontological orientation), this might open a Pandora’s 
box, in that it takes the form of a prima philosophia (first philosophy—the 
foundation for all other areas of philosophical study). 
Floridi (2008a) explicitly defines his own “informational ontology,” 
called informational structural realism (ISR). According to him, ISR, like 
most versions of realism, has an ontological commitment “to the exis-
tence of a mind-independent reality addressed by and constraining our 
knowledge” (p. 31) as well as “to a view of the world as the totality of 
informational objects dynamically interacting with each other” (p. 1). 
ISR posits that “explanatorily, instrumentally and predictively successful 
models (especially, but not only, those propounded by scientific theories) 
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at a given [level of abstraction] can be, in the best circumstances, increas-
ingly informative about the relations that obtain between the (possibly 
sub-observable) informational objects that constitute the system under 
investigation (through the observable phenomena)” (p. 39). ISR is akin 
to the “naturalist fallibilist realist adequatist perspectivalism” (NFRAP) of 
applied computational ontology: epistemological naturalism is the view 
that our primary source of knowledge is the findings of natural science; 
realist fallibilism holds that there is an objective reality, knowledge of it is 
possible, and that our knowledge suffers from incompletion and human 
fallibility; perspectivalism asserts that knowledge of the world is made up 
of multiple legitimate perspectives; and adequatism posits that this knowl-
edge cannot be reduced to any single veridical perspective (Compton, 
2014b; Grenon, 2008). Floridi supports the proposition of ISR with for-
mal logic and diagrammatic reasoning at a disciplinary level beyond the 
scope of our purposes here, but part of his reasoning for developing and 
adopting ISR is relevant and addressed below. 
Digital Ontology
Digital ontology lies within the overlapping domains of information and 
ontology and helps disclose some of the philosophical orientations essen-
tial to this discussion. One must clarify an inevitable confusion about the 
terms ontology and metaphysics to preface a discussion such as this. Ana-
lytic philosophy, for the most part, defines ontology as a highly structured, 
relationship-based classification system (the kind on which computational 
ontology is based) and defines metaphysics as the study of Being (Furner, 
2010). Heideggerian philosophy asserts the converse: that ontology is a 
foundation for all philosophy and asks the question, “What is Being qua 
Being?” (Heidegger, 1962). A truly Heideggerian ontological approach to 
comprehending the digital would ask, what is the digital with respect to 
Being as such? What Capurro (2006) and Eldred (2011) call “digital on-
tology” is actually an ontological (Heideggerian) approach to understand-
ing the digital because it is unlikely that Heidegger would put qualifiers 
on ontology; he would say that this too is a form of metaphysics. 
The dialectic between the analytic approaches used by Floridi and 
applied ontologists and the Heideggerian approaches to ontology—two 
philosophically incommensurable orientations—weaves an awkward tap-
estry exemplifying a parallax view of ontology relevant to information 
studies comprised of points of view that do not come together like puzzle 
pieces to form a coherent picture but nonetheless, taken collectively, dis-
close an inchoate whole. I make a Žižekian assertion that ontology’s in-
choate appearance does not stem from the fact that we face theoretical 
or knowledge gaps without which we might obtain a clear picture; rather, 
ontology and attempts to articulate it are inchoate. Critical examination 
always poses traumatic interstices in our mental-reality representations 
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wherein we face the uncanny or alien that comprises the substratum of 
our understanding. 
Digital ontology perfectly exemplifies the need for a parallax approach 
to ontological understanding. It presents a dialectic wherein philoso-
phers of different camps use the same word, in many respects talk about 
the same thing, reach some of the same conclusions, and yet are in some 
respects diametrically opposed, use completely different discourses and 
methodologies, and prima facie use the term ontology to denote dissimilar 
perspectives. The awkward, tangled dialectic presented here takes place 
between analytic philosopher Floridi and the continental, Heidegger- 
influenced philosophy of Capurro (2006) and Eldred (2011). Both Ca-
purro and Eldred at times promote and at other times seem to infer that 
their work is digital ontology. Their thinking is a deconstruction of the 
current worldview, culminating from ancient Greek to modern philoso-
phy, in which we cast reality as reducible to number and logos (that is, 
mathematics and ordered reasoning), and, therefore, that we can per-
fectly represent all that we know, and potentially all that there is, digitally. 
Similarly, but in a divergent manner, Floridi (2008b) describes and ar-
gues against digital ontology as a kind of cosmology wherein the physical 
universe is comprised of, or at least can be “adequately modeled,” using 
discrete units like integers or bits—that is, digitally. Floridi frames his ar-
gument against digital ontology by employing Kant’s rebuttal of proposi-
tions, stating that the world is either discrete (digital) or continuous (ana-
logue). Floridi says that 
the age-old question about the discrete vs. continuous nature of reality 
has been recast in the more fashionable terms of digital vs. analogue 
ontology [and that] digital (discrete) vs. analogue (continuous) is a 
Boolean dichotomy typical of the computational paradigm of our age, 
but both digital and analogue are only “modes of presentation of Be-
ing” (to paraphrase Kant), that is, ways in which reality is experienced 
and conceptualised by an epistemic agent, at a given level of abstraction. 
(p. 152; emphasis in original) 
He instead argues in favor of an “informational ontology” (p. 152), ISR, 
mentioned above. Although ISR is essential to Floridi’s intellectual arse-
nal, an in-depth account of it would distract from the dialectic presented 
here. 
Eldred (2012a) provides relevant criticism of Floridi’s (2011) work on 
contemporary privacy matters in which Floridi employs his informational 
ontology by arguing that, like the rest of reality, human identity is reduc-
ible to informational structures and the relationships therein. Eldred ob-
jects to Floridi’s “ontology of the self” as “a theoretical construction sup-
posed to ‘model’ a certain ‘system,’ just like a scientist models reality with 
a theory on the basis of certain made-up hypotheses, interrogating real-
ity with experiments to get the answers he needs to achieve an effective, 
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successful intervention into this reality” (p. 105). This objection is due, in 
part, to Eldred’s Heideggerian orientation, which holds that human exis-
tence is a fundamentally different sort of Being than that of objects in the 
world. According to Heidegger, science is good at disclosing information 
about present-at-hand objects in the world, but human existence, what 
we consider our “selfhood,” is not a present-at-hand object. Therefore, 
strictly scientific exploration of human existence can only disclose super-
ficialities: science may tell us what we are but not who we are. 
Although Eldred and Capurro refer to their work as digital ontology, I 
believe, within the Heideggerian parameters they set, that qualifiers do 
not belong on ontology, since, according to Heidegger, ontology is the 
foundational philosophy asking, “What is Being?” So, like Floridi, what 
Capurro and Eldred do is a critique and, unlike Floridi, a Heideggerian 
ontological analysis of the digital casting of Being. Floridi would likely say 
that his is an ontological analysis also, but one more in line with analytic 
philosophical methodologies (for example, problem-oriented, formally 
logical, and so on), whereas Capurro and Eldred use the continental phil-
osophical methodologies of Heidegger (phenomenology, hermeneutics, 
and so on). 
I agree with Floridi’s, Eldred’s, and Capurro’s assertions that ultimately 
this digital casting is wrong, but contend that this casting, which both El-
dred and Capurro deconstruct, provides a useful paradigm, theoretical 
model, or lens through which to see the world, which can help us under-
stand and further advance scientific and technological advancement. You 
might ask why, if my sympathies lie more with Eldred and Capurro than 
with Floridi, although I believe that Floridi’s contribution on the topic is 
also helpful, I concur to varying degrees with the conflicting discourses. 
I believe that these different perspectives are powerful and provide valu-
able insights into our current age as well as the possible teleology leading 
to this age and what may lie ahead of it. For example, we take for granted 
that the basis of life is encoded genetic information that runs like a pro-
gram outwardly expressed as inherited phenotypical traits analogous to 
the executed output of information encoded in computer programs. Nev-
ertheless, however helpful this analogy is in assisting our understanding 
of biology and to the advancement of biological and computer science, it 
is just that—an analogy. It seems unjustifiable to place biology and com-
putation into the same ontological domains, except for instances wherein 
these domains overlap—for example, cybernetic medicine. Regardless of 
how similar the patterns found in the brute facts disclosed by biological 
science and the patterns created or disclosed by computer science are, to 
say that those patterns are of the same type, at this point, appears to be as 
unjustifiable as saying that organisms and machines are of the same type—
except again wherein those domains overlap in areas like prosthetic and 
orthotic medicine. As we will see in the discussion that follows, Floridi’s 
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informational ontology explicitly articulates this “re-ontologization” of re-
ality wherein hardware, software, everyday objects, plants, animals, and 
human beings alike comprise an information ecology. 
Ontological Perspectives on the Digital Revolution
In his Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Freud (1916–1917/2010) 
states that in previous centuries up to his time, the “self-love of men” suf-
fered three “major blows” or humiliations. The first was at the hands of 
Copernicus, with his heliocentric model, who disclosed that humanity is 
literally not the center of the universe. That may sound puerile, since we 
have taken this fact for granted for centuries, but nevertheless, people 
were persecuted and killed for asserting heliocentrism, and acceptance 
of the cosmology removing us from the axis mundi was certainly a collec-
tive trauma regardless of the fact that the truth, in many more ways, set us 
free. Darwin delivered the second blow: we took comfort in our status as 
beings set apart from the animal kingdom, but the theory of evolution via 
natural selection showed that Homo sapiens is just another mammal with 
remarkable adaptive traits, the most notable being self-awareness and 
reason. With the latter in mind, Freud announced the “third and most 
wounding blow from the psychological research” of his time disclosing “to 
the ego that it is not even master in its own house, but must content itself 
with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously in its mind” 
(p. 3361). Freud says that none of the three men to whom these wounds/
blows are attributed were the first to proclaim the truths that they did. 
Two millennia earlier, the Pythagoreans had a notion of the earth not 
being the center of the universe. The earliest religious beliefs, such as to-
temism, held animals and plants to be the revered ancestors of humanity. 
Furthermore, Freud credits Schopenhauer (among other philosophers) 
as a forerunner of psychoanalysis, in that Schopenhauer asserted that not 
only individuals, or humanity in general, but all of reality is comprised of 
an unconscious will out of which the things of this world come into being. 
Floridi sees the digital revolution as the fourth revolution that usurps 
(like Freud’s three wounding blows) humanity’s view of itself and the 
world; he sees this as a re-ontologization, or reclassification, of the fun-
damental nature of reality. Similar to Freud’s contention that the three 
wounding blows were revolutions based on ideas that had been around 
for some time, Floridi (2014) argues that the information age actually 
began 6,000 years ago with the development of writing during the Bronze 
Age. Furthermore, he notes that with the proliferation of technology like 
ambient intelligence, ubiquitous computing, the internet of things, and 
the like, it is easy to imagine that we will have a worldview similar to an-
cient animism that attributes sentience and volition to our environment. 
Eldred (2012b) sees the same phenomena of the digital age and asserts 
that they embody the culminating thread of Western thought dating back 
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to ancient Greek philosophy wherein number and logos are lifted off of 
physical reality represented ultimately in digital code: 
Number is both placeless and positionless, and it is also discrete, in 
contrast to geometric figure, which is continuous in the sense that all 
the points that go toward making it up hang together very tightly. This 
distinction has momentous consequences for the history of mathemat-
ics and mathematical science up to the present day, including in math-
ematical logic and quantum physics, in which disciplines there are still 
unresolved antinomies directly relating to discreteness vs. continuity. 
(p. 87; emphasis in original) 
Capurro (2006) argues that this digital cast of Being, or digital ontology, 
in which we conceive the world as fundamentally digital or at least as digi-
tally representable, is our current zeitgeist. Eldred and Capurro provide 
phenomenological deconstruction of digital ontology, whereas Floridi 
argues that the presumptions that digital ontology makes—that reality 
can be reduced to either the discrete (digital) or the continuous (ana-
logue)—were already successfully dismantled by Kant. 
In addition to ISR, Floridi holds that the digital revolution radically 
increases the salience of the infosphere as an ontological domain con-
sisting of inforgs, and continues to do so until there is no longer even 
a seamless boundary between the infosphere and the rest of reality. To 
clarify, what Floridi refers to as the infosphere is likely similar to Eldred’s 
(2011, p. 75) digital ekmageion insofar as in their early stages, these realms 
consist of not only cyberspace but also other communication media.5 In-
forgs are, like the name suggests, informational organisms residing in 
the infosphere. Again, in the early stages of the digital revolution, inforgs 
are likely akin to what Eldred calls “digital beings” (applications, ava-
tars, documents, viruses, and so on) comprised of binary code that, in a 
sense, inform the stampable mass of the digital ekmageion. Unlike the digi-
tal ekmageion and digital beings, however, Floridi holds that with the re- 
ontologization brought about by the fourth revolution, everything we 
consider to be distinct from information media and digital or informa-
tional entities will eventually be recognized as informational in nature; in 
other words, we will recognize all of reality as the infosphere and every-
thing in it as inforgs, including ourselves. 
Floridi (2010) calls for an ethics that treats the infosphere as an ecol-
ogy to be stewarded in much the same way that environmentalism calls 
for stewardship of the ecosphere. He states that the fourth revolution 
is not about future anthropomorphic robots or cyborgs. He goes on to 
say, however, that “the possibility of fanciful post-human IT-enabled or 
IT-enhanced beings, whether genetically or prosthetically, should be ap-
preciated, philosophically, as the symptom of a deeper transformation in 
the way in which we are reassessing our nature . . . that we can think co-
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herently about such future humanity shows that something deeper in our 
self-conception is being revised silently” (p. 16).
Floridi makes a strong case for the digital revolution being as signifi-
cant as the Copernican, Darwinian, and Freudian revolutions; it is indeed 
reshaping, reorienting, and perhaps re-ontologizing our worldview. More-
over, as noted, Freud referred to the first three revolutions as “wounding 
blows”; some might consider the casting of our world and selfhood as 
essentially informational to also be such a blow. I contend that the digital 
age seems more like a shift from the Newtonian mechanistic worldview, 
in the same way that the mechanistic worldview was a shift from the Aris-
totelian worldview. Both the Newtonian worldview and digital revolution 
are based on defining technology metaphors: the Newtonian on the ma-
chine, and the digital revolution on computational technology. 
The fundamental difference I see here is the following. Freud’s three 
wounding blows were scientific findings that altered our perception of 
reality and ourselves, eventually bringing us, as Žižek (2006) points out, 
through the humanistic Renaissance up to modernity wherein humanity 
loses its “privileged place and is reduced to just another element of real-
ity” (p. 164). On the other hand, the Newtonian and digital worldviews 
seem like paradigms based less on some defining breakthrough scientific 
findings and the disillusionment that ensued than on metaphorical lenses 
modeled on the defining technologies of their respective eras; for exam-
ple, through most of the modern era we were complex biological ma-
chines driven by immaterial souls or neuro-electrical impulses, and now 
we are computational minds and genetically encoded flesh. 
Thus far we have dealt with ontological problems explicitly address-
ing information and the digital. The next sections are to some extent pe-
ripheral, but necessary to expand on ontological perspectives related to 
the philosophy of information, in that they speak to the important topic 
of our field—knowledge management—and articulate why, perhaps, in-
formation should not take ontological priority when attending to issues 
within and relevant to LIS. 
Applied Computational Ontology
One primary distinction between Floridi’s, Eldred’s, and Capurro’s ap-
proachs is their philosophical orientations. As Eldred (2012a, p. 104) 
points out, although Floridi at times refers to “Being,” he does not seem 
to be talking about Being qua Being as Heidegger does. Furthermore, 
his argumentation against the casting of reality as fundamentally digital 
is stylistically of the analytic philosophical tradition, and again, as Eldred 
notes, he seems to conceive ontology as the robust philosophical- 
classification methods reminiscent of the Vienna Circle that comprise 
the methodologies of computational ontology. This is abundantly clear in 
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applied ontology (Munn & Smith, 2008), which uses analytic philosophi-
cal ontology and knowledge-management principles of less complex in-
formation organization (indices, thesauri, and so on). Computational 
ontology—particularly applied ontology (as defined in Munn and Smith), 
in that it seeks to represent reality in an unambiguous, parsimonious, 
and comprehensive way—presents problems that are not merely issues 
of practical application but instead revive enduring questions about the 
nature of reality and human understanding. 
Applied ontologists hold that computational ontologies, when com-
piled correctly, are analogous to windows that accurately disclose knowl-
edge of the world (Smith & Grenon, 2004). Compton (2014b) argues 
that computational ontology, and its close relative artificial intelligence, 
asserts and implies things about reality and human existence that seem 
to be influenced by our understanding of information technology. In 
some regards, applied ontology might be construed as a form of digital 
ontology, in that it views the world as being “adequately modelled by dis-
crete values” (Floridi, 2008b, p. 151)—that is, the digital. However, com-
putational ontologists might argue that the principles in computational- 
ontology development are dependent on the digital substrate of binary 
code only because they use expert systems comprised “of software dedi-
cated to performing the [reasoning] tasks that a human expert would 
perform” (Grenon, 2008, p. 61). Applied ontology’s practical origin is the 
pursuit of an “Esperanto of databases” (Smith & Klagges, 2008, p. 21) in 
order to solve the “Tower of Babel problem”: the lack of interoperabil-
ity between information systems due to different controlled vocabular-
ies used to define the same objects, concepts, relationships, and so on 
in reality (Grenon, 2008, p. 73). Applied ontologists employ a naturalist 
epistemology, as part of NFRAP mentioned earlier, which holds the meth-
odology and findings of natural science to be the primary means by which 
we attain knowledge about the world. 
As one can imagine, this raises objections from those concerned with 
the knowledge management of domains outside of that of the hard sci-
ences because it seems that naturalist epistemology might not be a suit-
able orientation for systems designed for cultural history or other exam-
ples from the humanities. Fonseca (2008) challenges the Esperanto of 
databases approach of applied ontology by referring to it as the “New-
speak Solution,” an obvious pejorative referencing Orwell’s novel 1984 
wherein citizens’ thought and behavior are controlled, in part, by a state-
sanctioned language that restricts vocabulary and definitions to make it 
nearly impossible to conceive of revolt. Fonseca sees the Newspeak of 
applied ontology as a kind of authoritarian, cookie-cutter control over 
knowledge management that unnecessarily limits information systems’ 
potential to attend to cultural nuances and variations of concepts in infor-
mation sources. He offers an alternative Heidegger/Gadamer-influenced 
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hermeneutical approach to ontology development that, he argues, can 
address these nuances and variations. 
One may speculate that a parallax approach incorporating, or perhaps 
a synthesis between, applied ontology and computational ontologist views 
like Fonseca’s might be desirable because applied ontology is a straight-
forward solution to the Tower of Babel problem, but Fonseca’s critique 
of it raises legitimate concerns and suggests a solution that may be more 
difficult to implement systematically than applied ontology. Both, again, 
exemplify the parallax gap between those influenced by analytic philoso-
phy and those influenced by the continental tradition. The next section 
seems to step further away from the topic of the philosophy of informa-
tion and information ontology but is vitally relevant because it challenges 
the centrality of information regarding ontological perspectives within 
the context of information studies. 
Relevant Ontological Perspectives That Are Not 
Information-Centered
Frohmann (2004) half-heartedly dismisses Capurro’s and Eldred’s 
views on digital ontology and the need for a new philosophical category 
attending to digital-age phenomena. He also addresses possible shortcom-
ings in the way that natural scientists throughout history have interpreted 
how nature informs us about itself. Frohmann gives the document onto-
logical priority over information, citing linguistic and phenomenological 
critiques of how information and meaning are used, in addition to historical 
analyses of documentary practices in science. He cites Nunberg’s discus-
sion of how differing conceptions of information confound “the bound- 
aries between several genetically distinct categories of experience” (Nun-
berg, 1996, p. 114). Frohmann (2004) states that to conceive information 
“as abstract, noble document content indifferent to the transformation of 
its vehicles and stripped of all material, institutional, and social supports” 
amounts to perceiving “it as belonging to the same ontological category 
as the immaterial, intentional, and mental substance present to an indi-
vidual mind in a state of understanding that document” (pp. 389–390). 
This poses problems because an author’s intentions, the subject matter, 
and the user’s interpretation of the document (categorically different 
things) together help comprise this gossamery notion of information—
that of which the document informs the user. 
Frohmann observes what he feels is a similar philosophical problem 
between this typical conceptualization of information and the traditional 
understanding of meaning. He explicates Wittgenstein’s language-game 
proposition, which argues against the conventional notion of meaning 
as a kind of ethereal object attaching itself to words. Wittgenstein holds 
that the meaning of a word is simply the way in which the word is used 
in linguistic context: meaning comprises the rules that words obey in the 
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game of language. Frohmann goes on to say that “because ‘meaning’ is 
grammatically related to ‘information’ by virtue of the unexciting truth 
that a meaningless sign cannot be informing, similar conclusions follow 
for a philosophy of information” (p. 395). Put differently, placing infor-
mation into the ontological category of an intangible substance attached 
to otherwise meaningless symbols or passing through media is a “super-
stition” that attributes “magical or occult properties” to it (p. 395). One 
should instead regard a document’s informativeness to be contingent on 
its institutional and cultural contexts, as well as its medium. 
As an example, Frohmann notes how early modern scientists meta-
phorically conceptualized their documented experiments as reading from 
the book of nature: “When it came to the manufacture of knowledge, it was 
not possible to suppose that nature’s information could speak for itself” 
(p. 399). He points out the encumbrance of transcribing “the book of na-
ture into the book of mankind,” especially when trying to lash “nature to 
the rack” of human-fabricated experiments and convince others that this 
divulges nature’s secrets “rather than freaks spawned by mysterious ma-
nipulations of fantastic instruments by devotees of a secret cult” (p. 398). 
To accomplish this, Frohmann states that early modern era continental 
natural scientists like Galileo infused the articulation of their experiments 
with the axiom-centered documentary practices of geometry to create a 
“literary performance” that made findings sound “as evident and obvious 
as geometrical axioms” (p. 400). 
Scientists of Restoration England, in contrast to continental natural 
scientists like Galileo, tried to construct “knowledge from the certified 
occurrence, at a particular time and place, of a granular, theory-resistant 
fact of nature rather than from the certainty of axioms” (p. 402). These 
scientists sought high probability instead of certainty; they recorded ex-
perimental details using stylized documentary practices to achieve verisi-
militude that could authoritatively express high probability. 
According to Frohmann, for both early modern scientific camps and 
scientific documentation in general, the meaningfulness of the experi-
mental reports relies upon “culturally specific, historically determined, 
and institutionally disciplined documentary practices” (p. 405). Based on 
this reasoning, one might conclude that the applied ontologists’ proposi-
tion that one should consider computational ontologies as windows into 
reality reiterates the early modern scientists’ aspiration to transcribe the 
book of nature and disregards how the informativeness of representations 
in those systems are contingent on the context of historical and institu-
tional documentary practices (Compton, 2014a). 
Frohmann’s (2004) analysis seems in some regard to be an antiphiloso-
phy of information, the sort of which is essential to addressing important 
counterpoints and antithetical perspectives regarding information when 
compiling a parallax ontology and the role of information therein—the 
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more knowledgeable the contributions and the more parallax gaps that 
are identified, the more comprehensive the picture becomes. Next, I will 
briefly explore information’s role in the foundation of LIS. 
The Centrality of Information in Information Studies
We have discussed how information as a philosophical concept is shaping 
views on our world and ourselves in general, but what about with respect 
to information studies? Many in our field would argue that the proposi-
tion of information being the conceptual focus of LIS is incorrect because 
the focus of LIS is not information but rather the user. Focus on the user of 
information technology is supposedly what distinguishes LIS from fields 
like MIS and computer science. Even if the latter is correct (which I think 
it is), what distinguishes the user from other human subjects? Implicit in 
the notion of the user is that he or she uses information technology, or 
has the potential to use information technology, or should be given the 
potential to use information technology (the nearly unanimous ethical 
proclamation that the digital divide should be narrowed). 
More traditionally, one might simply say that the purpose of a prac-
titioner in LIS is to help the user find the information for which he or 
she is looking. The librarian can accomplish this through the reference 
interview, but there is growing emphasis on information literacy: the abil-
ity to use available resources to find the information one wants or needs. 
Notions like the digital divide imply that there exists no real distinction be-
tween the user and nonuser because everyone either has or should have 
the potential to find the information he/she needs; even those who do 
not have access to or do not know how to find the information they need 
are, in some respect, considered part of a user population—in this case, 
the nonusers. So, in this regard, despite criticism of his being “innocent 
of the social character of a field like LIS and the way it constructs itself” 
(Cornelius, 2004, p. 386), Floridi (2002) was, in some sense, correct in his 
view that information is the foundation of LIS (or at least its focus): LIS 
studies and trains practitioners to meet the needs of the user; the user is 
a member of some population that either utilizes information technology 
or should be utilizing it—and everyone should be. One can see where 
this leads: that the central focus of LIS is homo informari, “the one to be 
informed.”
The concept of information, as well as the philosophical foundation of 
LIS, is the objet petit a (“the unattainable object of desire”) (Hayles, 2012, 
p. 216) of our field, in that it always remains out of grasp though sought 
diligently by scholars. For example, I recall doctoral seminars wherein we 
devoted hours to the topic of “Who are we and what is it that we do?” 
Likewise, I am sure I am not alone in my wincing when asked what field I 
am in and receive the follow-up to my response: “library and information 
studies—so, what is that exactly?” Despite its polysemy, or more precisely 
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what Floridi (2004) calls information’s “ti esti ” nature (p. 566),6 it is per-
ceived to be the central focus of not only our field but of our present 
zeitgeist. Because it is both the defining concept of our time and philo-
sophically one of the most problematic—it is elusive, yet most often fore-
most in our minds—thus, the most comprehensive ontological approach 
to understanding information and the wide range of topics in this field 
should resemble something like Žižek’s parallax ontology. 
Conclusion
The preceding sections explored the topics of information and ontol-
ogy from disjointed perspectives: the ways in which the digital revolution 
is shaping our fundamental understanding of reality; Floridi’s informa-
tional ontology ISR; Floridi’s, Capurro’s, and Eldred’s critiques of digital 
ontology; applied computational ontology; and Frohmann’s document- 
centered ontological approach to understanding changes in information 
and communication technology. It is up to the reader to decide if the 
employment of Žižek’s style of parallax ontological analysis effectively dis-
closed the gaps and tensions in the dialectic created, and the need to 
tarry with those incommensurabilities without dismissing any particular 
worthwhile perspective or creating an unnatural synthesis among them 
all. 
Assuming that most researchers and practitioners in LIS and related 
fields understand ontology to be a somewhat esoteric category of knowl-
edge management is likely a safe hypothesis. Because of the broad scope 
and interdisciplinary nature of LIS and related fields, immersion in the 
complex discourse on the topic is certainly not a requirement for good 
scholarship or service in the meeting of information needs. Furthermore, 
it is probably not necessary for practitioners in knowledge management 
to engage in meta-analysis of philosophical ontology in order to develop 
effective information systems. Likewise, even philosophers employing ad-
vanced analytic methodologies in collaboration with computer scientists 
would hardly find such engagement necessary for their purposes. So, for 
our own purposes, what can we gain by engaging in the Sisyphean task 
of grabbing the stone of ontology that we know no philosopher has ever 
rested atop the hill of our understanding? Like Floridi’s elementary prob-
lem—“What is information?”—it may be best to leave these topics to those 
in the ivory tower across campus, whose job it is to tackle questions for 
which there will likely never be a definitive answer. Again, we can engage 
in good social research on user populations in need, teach information 
specialists, and serve patrons effectively without nailing down a conclu-
sive definition of information or navigating the labyrinthine discourse on 
ontology.
Regardless of how true these premises may be concerning being effec-
tive practitioners and researchers without engaging in philosophy, it is 
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invalid to conclude that such engagement is fruitless or should be left to 
someone else. As Furner (2010) points out, there are philosophical ques-
tions to be asked both about and from within information studies. We are 
lucky that a handful of philosophers like Luciano Floridi and Raphael Ca-
purro have extended their expertise into our amorphous, dynamic, shift-
ing, and possibly endangered discipline to join the small ranks of scholars 
in our field, such as Jesse Shera, Patrick Wilson, John Budd, Ronald Day, 
Bernd Frohmann, Jonathan Furner, Ken Herald, and Birger Hjørland, 
to name but a few of the few. However, this is a digression in the defense 
of philosophy in LIS rather than of the exploration of the philosophy of 
information and ontology. 
Early in this paper I identified a few good, practical purposes that this 
kind of discourse serves, but it is important primarily because address-
ing issues like the nature of information and the philosophy influencing 
information-system development and social understanding of the digital 
age can, for better or worse, alter the way we do research, design infor-
mation systems, and serve user populations. In their broadest senses, the 
topics of information and ontology touch all of these disciplinary continents, 
and although philosophical investigation of information and ontology 
may go unnoticed for the most part, it can sometimes quickly and some-
times slowly facilitate tectonic shifts in these continents. To some, it may 
be shocking to hear that our field is amorphous and possibly in danger, 
but I hold that this is not simply due to the uncertain future of technol-
ogy and the ironic danger of it possibly rendering LIS obsolete; instead, 
LIS maintains its equanimity by riding the wave of technological change 
and maintaining its interdisciplinary character. Without someone within 
the field readdressing the issues in the philosophy of information and is-
sues regarding the nature of reality found in ontology and metaphysics, 
we risk losing our bearings amid the conflicting methodologies and dis-
courses of the different disciplines contributing to our own, not to men-
tion losing foresight and hindsight in the crescendo of novelty we cur-
rently face that only seems to gain momentum. Furthermore, and most 
importantly relevant to this paper, without a flexible, yet grounded and 
methodical approach like Žižek’s parallax ontology to work with the gaps, 
tensions, and alterities both between and within the respective discourses 
and methodologies, our only choices are to pick a camp and stick with 
it, allow ourselves to remain perpetually lost and confused, or stay philo-
sophically neutral and focus on practical matters—the latter probably is 
the best choice of the three. I argue that we need folks who take the third 
choice more than they need us—folks who engage in ontology and the 
philosophy of information. Nevertheless, folks like us are still necessary to 
the survival of the field.
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Notes
 1. Floridi (2002) had argued that the philosophy of information is preferable to Shera’s 
social epistemology for LIS’s intellectual foundation because LIS’s focus is information 
rather than knowledge. 
 2. Kevin Kelly (2002), in a Wired article titled “God Is the Machine,” cites a similar fictional 
scenario in Isaac Asimov’s short story “The Last Question” (1956). The article is a kind of 
exegesis of pan-computational theories and pseudotheological views modeled on com-
putation; that is, computational models of intelligent design and notions of God being 
computational in nature. 
 3. Žižek’s philosophy, to a great degree, is a philosophical expansion and exploration of 
Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory. 
 4. In Heidegger’s philosophy, “ontological difference” refers to the distinction between be-
ings or entities, and Being as such. According to Heidegger (1962), we only have access 
to Being through beings, but Being itself is not a being.
 5. In Plato’s Timeaus (2000), he describes the ekmageion (ἐκμαγεῖον) as an essential part of his 
creation myth and cosmology: “And the same argument applies to the universal nature 
which receives all bodies that must be always called the same; for, while receiving all things, 
she never departs at all from her own nature, and never in any way, or at any time, assumes 
a form like that of any of the things which enter into her; she is the natural recipient of all 
impressions, and is stirred and informed by them, and appears different from time to time 
by reason of them” (p. 38; emphasis added). Eldred borrows the notion of the ekmageion, 
or “stampable mass,” as a metaphor for cyberspace, as well as for all communication media. 
 6. This refers to Floridi’s (2004) following statement: “A genuine new discipline in philoso-
phy is easily identifiable, for it must be able to appropriate an explicit, clear, and precise 
interpretation of the classic ‘ti esti’ question, thus presenting itself as a specific ‘philosophy 
of.’ ‘What is information?’ achieves precisely this” (p. 566).
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